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FACING THE FUTURE OF OIL IN
COURTS:

A

U.S.

RECOMMENDATION FOR

CHANGING THE BREMEN DOCTRINE ON
ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM
SELECTION CLAUSES
Mark D. Mutschink*

WHEN

I.

INTRODUCTION

Exxon Mobil faced the nationalization of its oil-field

projects in Venezuela in 2007, it refused Venezuela's offer of
compensation and instituted international commercial arbitration.' The war of words that followed clearly depicted Venezuela's view
toward any perceived infringement on its sovereign hydrocarbon rights.
Members of Venezuela's government called Exxon officials "bandits and
thieves . . . trying to steal our future" 2 and Exxon's arbitration demand
and other court actions "judicial terrorism" and "economic hostage-taking." 3 In fact, Exxon can be considered fortunate to have been able to
negotiate for an arbitration clause in its contract with Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the Venezuelan national oil company (NOC). 4
The arbitration clause put Exxon and PDVSA in a neutral forum and
gave Exxon a chance to fight on a level playing field.5 This legal battle
reveals some key issues and raises some important concerns surrounding
the dealings between private U.S. companies and NOCs around the
world. For example, NOCs have the ability to wield both their private
economic power and state power, such as the power to simply nationalize
a private company's assets within their country. 6 Additionally, NOCs
seem increasingly hostile to resolving any disagreements outside their
* B.S., Texas A&M University, 1998. M.P.T., University of Texas Health Science
Center at San Antonio, 2001. J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law, 2010.
1. Sara Miller Llana, Exxon Fights Chavez' Venezuela for Compensation in Courts,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 11, 2008, at 4.
2. David Ivanovich & John Otis, Judge Grants Exxon Mobil Asset Request, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 14, 2008, at B1.
3. Loren Steffy, Chavez Drama Worth Nada, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 15, 2008, at B1.
4. Steven Mufson, Chavez's Oil Threats Slick but Not Solid: Halting Exports Would
Hurt Venezuela More Than U.S., WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2008, at D1.
5. See id.
6. See Ivanovich & Otis, supra note 2.
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own legal systems. 7 Finally, considering NOCs' importance in the worldwide energy sector, there should be serious concern that NOCs have the
power to directly impact the U.S. energy supply on a scale that could
affect national security and the economy.8
This article addresses the U.S. courts' doctrine regarding enforceability
of forum selection clauses and recommends a change to that doctrine
when one of the parties to the contract is a NOC. Section II lays out the
current landscape of energy policy, production, and consumption in the
United States and describes the features and actions of several NOCs
around the world. Section III addresses how NOCs are treated under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 9 Section IV describes
the current doctrine of forum selection clause enforcement in the U.S.
court system, and Section V offers a recommendation for changing that
doctrine when one party to a forum selection clause is a NOC.
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF ENERGY POLICY AND
REALITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROLE
OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES
It seems impossible to open the newspaper or log in to your homepage
without seeing a headline concerning some aspect of energy. The sheer
number of news, scholarly, and legal articles underlines the importance of
all things energy in the modern world. Search oil under Google News
and you get thousands of hits.1 0 A detailed inquiry into such a huge and
diverse subject matter is neither practical nor necessary for this comment.
However, describing the current state of U.S. energy policy, production,
and consumption and the role foreign NOCs play in U.S. energy supply
and demand is necessary to understand the timeliness and importance of
this comment's proposals. The following description begins with a quick
look at U.S. energy policy and the rhetoric surrounding energy security.
Next, the section discusses U.S. energy production and consumption, including what forecasters predict about the future of U.S. energy supply
and demand. The discussion ends with a description of NOCs: what they
are, why they are important, and what actions they have recently taken.
A.

ENERGY SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES

The federal and state governments of the United States consistently
offer energy security as a justification or explanation for their choices and

7. See Steffy, supra note 3.
8. Wajid Rasheed, The Oil Curtain and the Evolution of National Oil Companies, J.
PETROLEUM TECH., Feb. 2009, at 36, 36.
9. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2006).
10. Google News, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/news (last visited Aug. 4, 2010).
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policies with energy projects,"1 legislation, 12 and administrative action. 13
However, these officials, legislators, and agencies frequently fail to adequately define the concept of energy security. 14 The National Conference
of State Legislatures provides one definition: "Energy security refers to a
resilient energy system .... [It is] capable of withstanding threats through
a combination of active, direct security measures . . . and passive or more

indirect measures-such as redundancy, duplication of critical equipment,
diversity in fuel, other sources of energy, and reliance on less vulnerable
infrastructure."1 5 Within the limits of this discussion, energy security is
used as a shorthand reference to securing supplies of conventional energy
sources, development of alternative energy sources, and efforts to improve energy efficiency. Two important justifications for promoting energy security are (1) promoting national security and (2) promoting
economic growth and stability.16
1. Energy Security and National Security
United States officials now frequently recognize that ensuring energy
security is a vital part of ensuring national security.' 7 Then-Senator Barack Obama gave a speech in 2006 equating energy security with national
security.' 8 And, in a recent proclamation, President Obama said: "Well
funded energy research and development will not only help protect our
environment and support our communities, but it will also address concerns of global competitiveness and national security." 19 The Department of Energy (DOE) raises the issues of both U.S. national security
and U.S. economic security when it talks about the supply and demand of
energy sources. 20 Finally, the Department of Defense (DOD) also recognizes the link between energy security and national security. 21 For exam11. See, e.g., Alexandra Zavis, Army Green Isn't Just Fatigues, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2009, at Al (characterizing Department of Defense as "testing ground . . . for green
initiatives").
12. See, e.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 17001-17386 (Supp. I 2009). Subchapter II of the Act is entitled "Energy Security
Through Increased Production of Biofuels," but energy security is not defined. See id.
13. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117, 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009) (requiring federal agencies to reduce emissions of GHG's justified in part by improving energy security).
14. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Subchapter II (offering no
definition of energy security); Zavis, supra note 11 (same); see also Exec. Order No. 13,514,
supra note 13, at 52,117.
15. MATTHEW H. BROWN, CHRISTIE REWEY & TROY GAGLIANO, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ENERGY SECURITY 7 (2003).
16. James A. Duffield, Irene M. Xiarchos & Steve A. Halbrook, Ethanol Policy: Past,
Present, and Future, 53 S.D. L. REV. 425, 441 (2008).
17. See Senator Barack Obama, Remarks before the Governor's Ethanol Coalition:
Energy Security is National Security (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.barackobama.
com/2006/02/28/energy..security-is national se.php.
18. See id.
19. Proclamation No. 8431, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Oct. 2, 2009).
20. Energy Sources, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov/energysources/index.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2010).
21.

U.S.

DEP'T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

5 (June 2008).
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ple, the 2008 National Defense Strategy acknowledges that energy
demands will affect national security issues in the future. 22 The DOD
foresees that even with investment in alternative energy sources, U.S. dependence on oil will continue to increase in the coming years. 23 To satisfy
demand, the United States will probably have to seek sources of supply in
more unstable areas of the world. 24
Recognizing the critical link between energy security and national security, the U.S. military began taking steps to improve its energy efficiency and to develop alternative energy sources. 2 5 For example, the
U.S. Army's training center at Fort Irwin in California is a proving
ground for alternative energy projects that could save both money and
lives in the field. 2 6 The Fort takes advantage of plug-in cars, solar- and
wind-powered computers, and foam-insulated tents to be more energy
efficient. 27 In another project, the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency is helping to fund research into algae-grown biofuel with the goal
of producing a reliable, alternative source of jet fuel.2 8 These two examples illustrate the U.S. military's commitment to improving energy efficiency and developing alternative fuel sources, both of which will lead to
increased energy security and national security.29
2.

Energy Security and Economic Growth and Stability

In addition to affecting national security, energy-security measures can
affect the growth and stability of the U.S. economy. 30 President Obama
recognized that the future of the U.S. economy is linked to continued
innovation in the science and technology of clean energy.3 1 One legislative effort to promote innovation and investment in clean energy is the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act).32
The Recovery Act provides for the investment of $80 billion for clean
energy development.3 3 This investment lays "the foundation for a clean
energy economy that will create a new generation of jobs, reduce depen22. Id.
23. Id. at 16; see also infra Part II.B (discussing projected U.S. energy consumption
statistics).
24. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 21, at 16.
25. Zavis, supra note 11.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Ed Timms, Algae Could Become Reliable Jet Fuel Source, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, June 7, 2009, at A4.
29. See id.; Zavis, supra note 11.
30. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, President Obama Announces Over $467 Million in Recovery Act Funding for Geothermal and Solar Energy Projects (May 27, 2009).
31. Id. Developing clean-energy projects potentially impacts energy security by improving energy efficiency and creating alternative energy sources in the short term and
reducing dependence on oil in the long term. See supra Part II.A.
32. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
33. Memorandum from Vice President Joe Biden to President Barack Obama, Progress Report: The Transformation to a Clean Energy Economy 1 (Dec. 15, 2009).
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dence on oil and enhance national security." 34 Vice President Biden estimates that the total investment value, including appropriations, federal
loans, and tax incentives could be up to $150 billion for clean energy
projects. Additionally, the investment could create over 850,000 new jobs
in renewable energy and smart-grid projects.3 5 Most importantly, variations in oil prices should not directly affect any of these jobs. 36 The hope
is that this investment will help transform the U.S. energy system and
lead to less dependence on foreign oil. 3 7 While the Recovery Act is a
sizable investment in clean energy, its long-term impact is questionable
especially considering that the United States spends over $500 billion
each year to meet its energy demands.3 8
The Recovery Act's investment in clean energy reflects the growing
realization that energy security is an important issue in our economic stability. The supply and price of oil can seriously affect the U.S. economy
in both the short and long term, a fact that hit home recently. 3 9 In 2008
and 2009, both U.S. and worldwide airlines were forced to cut back on
40
their capacity to stay afloat as oil prices hit $150 per barrel. The increased price also affected the DOD, which saw its energy bill increase
from $13 billion in 2007 to $20 billion in 2008.41 Although developing
alternative fuel sources and improving energy efficiency are both important steps toward achieving the goal of ending U.S. dependence on foreign oil and becoming the world's leader in clean energy, 42 the following
section demonstrates why continuing to secure U.S. supplies of oil abroad
remains of paramount importance.
B. U.S. ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION STATISTICS
The reality of U.S. energy consumption statistics and projections makes
it clear that this country depends on imported oil to meet demand and
43
will continue to depend on imported oil for years to come. The Energy
Information Administration (EIA) within the DOE compiled these sta44
The
tistics and forecasts, so the numbers are "policy-independent."
scope
the
demonstrate
statistics
consumption
and
production
most recent
of U.S. dependence upon foreign sources of oil. In 2008, total liquid34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 2, 4.
See id.
Id. at 1.
Energy Sources, supra note 20.
See Terry Maxon, In Turbulent Times, Big Airlines Shrink, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2010, at D1.
40. Id.
41. Zavis, supra note 11.
42. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, supra note 30.
43. See U.S. ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 146-47, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaflaeo/pdflappa.pdf.
44. Prices & Trends, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.energy.gov/pricestrends/
index.htm.
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fuel 4 5 consumption averaged over 19 million barrels per day, while domestic production was slightly more than 8 million barrels per day. 4 6 To
meet its demand for liquid fuels, the United States imported almost 10
million barrels of crude oil per day from foreign sources, which totaled
over two-thirds of the U.S. daily supply. 47
Tracking the source of U.S. oil imports reveals a supply-diversification
strategy, most likely as a method of securing supply against disruptions.
The United States imported oil from over eighty countries in significant
amounts in 2008.48 However, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela,
and Nigeria combined to supply over 67% of those crude-oil imports, 4 9
revealing a potential weakness in this diversification strategy. Also important, a vast majority of U.S. crude oil imports are from countries in
which NOCs control the production and sale of oil.50 In fact, NOCs of
the world control 88% of the world's proven oil reserves.5 1 Not only do
NOCs control reserves, they also account for the majority of the world's
oil production. 52 That means privately controlled oil companies produce
the minority of the world's supply.53 Moreover, the largest international
oil companies (IOCs) produced only 8% of the total oil in 2007.54 It is
clear from this data that NOCs of the world presently wield incredible
economic power, and that power is likely to increase in the coming years
because of continued growth in worldwide demand. 55
Although the United States is investing in developing alternative fuel
sources, improving energy efficiency, and reducing dependence on oil, the
effects of these efforts will not end dependence on imported oil in the
45. Liquid fuel supplies include crude oil, refined hydrocarbons, ethanol, and biodiesel
among others, while the liquid fuels actually consumed are usually refined hydrocarbons.
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 43, at 129.
46. Id. at 146-47 (noting that conventional domestic production equaled 7.68 million
barrels per day, and unconventional production equaled 0.66 million barrels per day for a
total of 8.34 million barrels per day of liquid fuels).
47. Id. at 129 (stating gross imports of crude oil equaled 9.78 million barrels per day in
2008).
48. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. IMPORTS BY COUNTRY
OF ORIGIN, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet-move-impcus-a2_nus-epO
imO mbblpd-a.htm (June 29, 2009) (showing eighty-three countries supplied at least one
thousand barrels of crude oil per day to the United States in 2008).
49. Id. Their respective contributions were: Canada, 20%; Saudi Arabia, 15.4%; Mexico, 12.1%; Venezuela, 10.6%; and Nigeria, 9.4%. See id.
50. Id.; THE WORLD BANK GROUP, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 14 (2008). Adding the imports from countries with NOCs and dividing by total imports reveals nearly 70% of imports come from countries with NOCs.
51. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY IN BRIEF: WHO ARE
THE MAJOR PLAYERS SUPPLYING THE WORLD OIL MARKET? (Jan. 28, 2009), availableat
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy-in-brief/worldoil-market.cfm.
52. Id. (noting that, in 2007, NOCs accounted for 52% of world oil production).
53. See id.
54. Id. (setting forth combined production of Exxon Mobil, BP, and Royal Dutch
Shell).
55. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, supra note 43, at 147 (noting that total consumption of liquid fuels projected to increase by over twenty-five million barrels per day
by 2035).
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near future. 56 The EIA predicts that U.S. consumption of liquid fuels will
remain relatively stable over the next twenty-five years.5 7 However, because of increased domestic biofuel production, improved efficiency standards, and increased domestic oil production, the projected percentage of
imported liquid fuels in 2035 drops to 45% of the total liquid-fuel consumption.5 8 This percentage represents a reduction in U.S. dependence
on imported oil but also highlights the fact that the United States will still
be "dependent" on foreign sources of oil and petroleum products for
45% of its needs. 59 In the next twenty-five years and beyond, U.S. energy
security will continue to rely upon foreign sources of oil despite improvements in clean energy, alternative fuels, and energy efficiency. 6 0 This
continued dependence on imported oil underscores the importance of
NOCs to U.S. energy security.
C.

AN OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES AND THEIR
IMPORTANCE To ENERGY SECURITY

1. What is a National Oil Company?
National oil companies are generally state-controlled corporations operating to develop the state's mineral resources-petroleum. 61 As noted
in Section II.B, NOCs control 88% of the world's proven petroleum
reserves. 62 Generally, NOCs develop and produce the state's oil resources while cooperating to some extent with the overall goals and strategies of the government. 63 NOCs differ significantly from IOCs that
must answer to their investors and must operate efficiently and quickly to
maximize profits.64 Another key difference between NOCs and IOCs is
that because NOCs control most world oil reserves, IOCs will most likely
have to buy their interests in oil fields from NOCs to gain access to potential fields.65
Although NOCs are generally created as corporate entities able to
enter into contracts in their own names, their operational independence
can differ significantly. 66 For example, Petr6leo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), the Brazilian NOC, is a mixed-stock corporation created under
56. See id. at 129 (estimating that the United States will still import over eight million
barrels of crude oil per day in 2035).
57. Id. (noting that U.S. liquid fuel consumption was 20.65 million barrels per day in
2007 and is estimated to be 22.06 million barrels per day in 2035).
58. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2010: EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 8 (Dec. 2009) available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiafl
aeo/pdfloverview.pdf.
59. See id.
60. See id.

61. ROBERT PIROG, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET i (2007).
62. See supra text accompanying note 51.
63. ENERGY IN BRIEF: WHO ARE THE MAJOR
MARKET?, supra note 51, at 1.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id.

PLAYERS SUPPLYING THE WORLD OIL

SMU LAW REVIEW

1350

[Vol. 63

Brazilian public law and must be majority-owned by the Brazilian government. 67 Petrobras is one of the more autonomous NOCs in the world,
with significant control over its strategy and operations. 68 However,
other NOCs act more as extensions of their governments, supporting government strategies and programs and not necessarily pursuing marketoriented goals. 69 This group of NOCs includes Saudi Aramco, Pemex,
and PDVSA-the NOCs of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela, respectively. 7 0 Remember that these three countries are the second, third,
and fourth largest sources of U.S. oil imports. 71 Even though these companies act more in line with the state's strategies and goals, they are still
separate legal entities created under the laws of their respective countries. 72 Recognizing the unique characteristics of NOCs and their importance to the international oil and energy markets is critical to developing
a logically consistent approach to dealing with them in the U.S. legal system. In addition to these characteristics, the rise of resource nationalism
should be considered when crafting legal rules applicable to NOCs.
2. National Oil Companies and the Rise (Again) of Resource
Nationalism
National oil companies are the historical products and the modern
agents of resource nationalism among the oil producing nations of the
world. 73 Professor Paul Stevens's recent article gives a very good historical breakdown of the cyclical nature of resource nationalism and the
many factors driving the cycle. 74 Professor Stevens's definition of resource nationalism has "two components-limiting the operations of private international oil companies (IOCs) and asserting a greater national
control over natural resource development."7 5 This definition is useful
because it is very easy to identify which NOC actions fall within the
bounds of resource nationalism. Whether resource nationalism is a motivating factor behind the acts of NOCs is important to this discussion because acts of resource nationalism are more akin to state action than
private action. 76
67. Petrobras By-Laws, ch.1, art. 1, PETROBRAS,

http://www.petrobras.com.br/en/

about-us/corporate-strategy/downloads/pdflpetrobras-by-laws.pdf
2010).

(last

visited Aug. 8,

68. ENERGY IN BRIEF: WHO ARE THE MAJOR PLAYERS SUPPLYING THE WORLD OIL
MARKET?, supra note 51.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
U.S. IMPORTS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, supra note 48.

Corporate Management, SAUDI ARAMco, http://www.saudiaramco.com (last vis-

ited Aug. 8, 2010); Corporate Governance, PEMEX, http://www.ri.pemex.com/index.cfm

(last visited Aug. 8, 2010); About PDVSA, PDVSA, http://www.pdvsa.com (last visited
Aug. 8, 2010).
73. See Paul Stevens, National Oil Companies and InternationalOil Companiesin the
Middle East: Under the Shadow of Government and the Resource Nationalism Cycle, 1 J. OF
WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus., 5, 12-14 (2008).
74. See generally id.
75. Id. at 5.

76. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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Recent history shows that resource nationalism is alive and well in
many parts of the oil producing world.77 In 2007, when oil prices were
high and climbing,78 PDVSA and Venezuela nationalized the oil fields of
many western oil companies. 79 During this time period, Venezuela used
oil income to increase spending on domestic social programs and weapons purchases.80 Also during this time, Iran was able to push back
against United Nations economic sanctions, and Russia stopped exports
of natural gas to the Ukraine to send a political message. 8 ' All of these
acts include elements of sovereign power and policy funded by the respective countries' NOCs. 8 2
There are several examples of recent NOC acts that have the characteristics of state action, such as nationalization of IOC oil fields, which can
be construed as resource nationalism at work. 83 One of the most infamous of these examples occurred in 2007 when PDVSA took majority
stakes in oil projects in the Orinoco Basin. 84 Two IOCs, including Exxon,
refused to accept the new contracts and instead demanded arbitration
under their contracts with PDVSA. 85 Exxon also aggressively pursued
attachment of PDVSA assets abroad and succeeded in freezing billions of
dollars of PDVSA's assets in the U.S., Dutch, and British courts.86 Exxon's tactic was understood as both a move to pressure PDVSA into better terms over the Orinoco Basin project and a signal to other NOCs that
Exxon would aggressively fight resource nationalism anywhere.8 7 However, in a limited victory for PDVSA, the British injunction freezing up to
$12 billion was overturned on appeal while the U.S. and Dutch injunctions appear to remain intact.8 8 As of the time of this comment, the case
remains docketed for arbitration in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. 89 PDVSA's action fits the definition of resource nationalism nicely90 because it limited the involvement of the
world's largest IOC and asserted greater control over the oil reserves in
77. See, e.g., Venezuela Ends Oil Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at C2.
78. Steve Geisi, Triple-digit Oil Prices Expected After 2007, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 17,
2007, 2:05 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/storylafter-2007-records-oil-expected-toturn-back-toward-100.
79. Simon Romero et al., Chavez Reopens Oil Bids to West as Prices Plunge, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at Al.
80. See Simon Romero et al., 3 Oil Countries Face a Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2008, at Al.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Llana, supra note 1.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Chris Kraul, Venezuela Oil Giant Tries End Run, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at
C3.
87. Llana, supra note 1.
88. Julia Werdigier, Court Orders Freeing of Some Venezuelan Assets, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2008, at C6.
89. Mobil Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27
(pending).
90. Stevens, supra note 73, at 5.
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the Orinoco River Basin.9 1
A more recent act in Venezuela demonstrates that resource nationalism is not just a concern of the mega IOCs anymore. 9 2 Petrosucre, a subsidiary of PDVSA, fell behind on payments due under a drilling contract
with Ensco International Inc., a drilling service company. 93 Ensco suspended drilling operations on its ENSCO 69 drilling rig in January 2009
because of Petrosucre's failure to make payment on past-due invoices of
up to $35.5 million.94 However, Petrosucre continued to operate ENSCO
69 with its own crews. 95 In May 2009, Ensco terminated the drilling contract with Petrosucre, but Petrosucre stated it would continue to operate
the ENSCO 69 drilling rig.9 6 Ensco followed up by announcing that it did
not foresee the return of ENSCO 69, had filed an insurance claim, and
was "evaluating legal remedies against Petrosucre for contractual and
other damages related to the rig's seizure." 97 It appears that the two
sides eventually came to a settlement, with PDVSA agreeing to pay Ensco $50 million, although it is unclear whether Ensco has regained control
of ENSCO 69.98 Interestingly, Ensco's most recent list of its drilling rig
assets does not include the ENSCO 69 rig.99
PDVSA also took over operations of private natural-gas-compression
plants in early June 2009.100 The involved companies sued PDVSA in a
New York state court to enjoin the NOC from drawing on lines of credit
set up for the original joint venture.101 The status of the case is unclear at
this time. All told, PDVSA nationalized the assets of more than seventy
oilfield services companies between January and August 2009.102
However, the cyclical nature of resource nationalism is becoming more
evident, as the recent decrease in global oil prices has placed many of the
oil producing countries and their NOCs in a "reverse oil shock." 103 As a
result, many of these countries' NOCs are inviting IOCs, as well as other
91. Llana, supra note 1, at 1.
92. See, e.g., Press Release, Ensco Int'l, Inc., Ensco International Reports on Status of
Operations in Venezuela (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.enscous.comlnewsroom/
press-releases [hereinafter Press Release, Ensco Int'l Reports].
93. Press Release, Ensco Int'l, Inc., Ensco International Terminates Contract for ENSCO 69 in Venezuela (June 8, 2009), available at http://www.enscous.com/newsroom/pressreleases [hereinafter Press Release, Ensco Int'l Terminates Contract].
94. Press Release, Ensco Int'l Reports, supra note 92.
95. Press Release, Ensco Int'l Terminates Contract, supra note 93.
96. Id.
97. Ensco Sees Rig Return Unlikely, Bus. NEws AM., July 17, 2009, http://
www.bnaamericas.com/news/oilandgas/Ensco-sees-rig-retumunlikely.
98. PDVSA, Ensco Settle for US$50mn - Report, Bus. NEWS AM., Dec. 14, 2009, http://
www.bnaamericas.com/news/oilandgas/PDVSA,_Ensco-settlefor_us_*50mn-_report.
99. ENSCO, http://www.enscous.com (follow "Rig Fleet" hyperlink; then select "North
and South America" under "Filter by Region") (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
100. Associated Press, Venezuela Plant Takeovers Affect Tulsa Company, THE
OKLAHOMAN, June 5, 2009, at B2.
101. Around the Region, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2009, at B7.
102. Chris Kraul, Snags Delaying 'Oil City', L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 14, 2009, at Bl.
103. Romero et al., supra note 80.
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NOCs, to negotiate for oil-field leases once again. 104 For example, Russia's NOCs recently signed a multi-billion dollar investment deal with
China.10 5 Libyan officials are courting foreign investors, including western oil companies, but at the same time they will not rule out the possibility of nationalizing energy interests in the country.10 6 Even Venezuela
and PDVSA are interested in getting IOCs to invest in a new oil-field
project in Soledad. 0 7
To successfully negotiate with NOCs, IOCs and the more recently
targeted oilfield services companies need clearly articulated legal rules
affecting NOCs. They need clarity on the legal standing of NOCs in U.S.
courts. They also need clarity on whether forum selection clauses are
enforceable. This can be, and should be, a very important negotiating
point since "dealing with a sovereign foreign government in its own statecontrolled judicial system can be trying, to say the least."s 0 8 The lack of a
clear legal framework for NOCs in the U.S. legal system may be one reason IOCs tried to renegotiate the project terms in Venezuela's Soledad
bidding to include international arbitration.109 However, it may be especially difficult to win an arbitration clause in negotiations, given NOCs'
state and economic power"i0 combined with reticence to resolve disputes
outside their own legal systems."' One suggestion for improving the
U.S. legal system's treatment of state-owned companies is to amend the
FSIA.11 2 However, this comment focuses on the current version of the
FSIA and recommends a change to the law of forum selection clauses as
an alternative that is easily adoptable through the common law.
III. NOCs AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT
The FSIA11 3 applies to virtually every suit brought against a NOC in
U.S. courts because NOCs are almost certainly "foreign states" under the
statute.114 Therefore, any private company seeking to sue a NOC in the
United States must overcome the FSIA's protections to proceed to the
merits of its claim.' 15 This section outlines the application of the FSIA to
NOCs and the basic reasoning behind the statute as it applies to NOCs.
104. See, e.g., Kristen Hays, Not So High and Mighty: Low Oil Prices Have Some Calling on Foreign Companies, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 19, 2009, at B1.
105. Id.
106. Lynn Cook, Libya Calls $100 Oil Fair Price: Envoy Won't Rule Out Nationalization, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2009, at B1.
107. See Kraul, supra note 102.
108. Eric Fox, Venezuela Still a Problem for Energy Sector, INVESTOPEDIA (May 4,
2009, 2:20 PM), http://stocks.investopedia.com.
109. See Kraul, supra note 102.
110. Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the Modern Era,18
J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y. 1, 18 (2008).
111. Alexia Burnet & Juan Agustin Lentini, Arbitration of International Oil, Gas, and
Energy Disputes in Latin America, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 591, 592 (2007).
112. See Riblett, supra note 110, at 1-4.
113. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2006).
114. § 1603(a)-(b); Riblett, supra note 110, at 3.
115. Riblett, supra note 110, at 7.
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The FSIA is really a jurisdictional statute and does not create any new
cause of action.116 It operates by conferring immunity to the jurisdiction
of U.S. courts on all foreign sovereigns." 7 Therefore, to determine
whether jurisdiction over a NOC would exist, two questions must be answered in the affirmative: (1) is a NOC a "foreign state" under the FSIA,
and (2) does an exception to immunity apply?" 8
A.

NOCs

ARE "FOREIGN STATES" UNDER THE

FSIA

NOCs are almost certainly considered foreign states for purposes of
the FSIA because they meet the definition of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. The FSIA's definition of a foreign state is found in
§ 1603(a)-(b):
For purposes of [the FSIA]-(a) A "foreign state", except as used in
section 1608 of this title, includes a political subdivision of a foreign
state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in
subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3)
which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor created under the laws of any
third country.119
NOCs are probably not political subdivisions of the state because that
definition is understood to include governmental units, like state, provincial, and city governments.120 Therefore, for the FSIA to apply, NOCs
must probably assert that they are an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.121 Under this definition, most NOCs will probably satisfy the
first and third prongs quite easily, with the only potential difficulty arising
under the second prong.122
Most NOCs should satisfy the first requirement because they are organized as corporations or some other legal equivalent.123 Saudi
Aramco, Pemex, PDVSA, and Petrobras are all organized as corporations.124 The third requirement is also usually easily met because these
corporations are almost always formed under the laws of their respective
116. § 1604; see also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 434 (1989); Riblett, supra note 110, at 6.
117. § 1604 ("[A] foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter.").
118. Riblett, supra note 110, at 7.
119. § 1603(a)-(b).
120. Riblett, supra note 110, at 9.
121. § 1604; Riblett, supra note 110, at 8-11.
122. Riblett, supra note 110, at 10.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 68-70, 72 and accompanying text.
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nations.12 5 However, if a NOC owned a subsidiary formed under the
laws of the United States or another third country, that subsidiary would
not be considered a foreign state under the FSIA.126
The key to whether a NOC would be an agency or instrumentality is if
it meets the second requirement, which requires it to be "an organ of a
foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, or [to have] a majority of
[its] shares or other ownership interest . . . owned by a foreign state or

political subdivision thereof." 127 There are two prongs within the second
requirement-the ownership prong and the organ prong-either is sufficient to satisfy the requirement.12 8
1. NOCs Should Satisfy the Ownership Prong
The ownership prong has been characterized as "more straightforward" than the organ-of-the-state prong.129 It is clear that many of the
world's NOCs satisfy the second requirement under the ownership prong.
As noted above, it is relatively easy to find out if a NOC is majorityowned by the state simply by looking on its website and at its enabling
statutes.13 0 The only difficulty with making the determination of whether
a NOC is majority-owned by the state is when transparency is very low,
which has been a concern about a NOCs for many industry observers. 31
However, another interesting issue is whether a subsidiary of a NOC can
be classified as an agency or instrumentality under the ownership prong.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in 2003 and held
that "[a] corporation is an instrumentality of a foreign state under the
FSIA only if the foreign state itself owns a majority of the corporation's
shares."1 32 In Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, a group of farm workers from
Latin America sued Dole Food Company and alleged that they were injured by exposure to a chemical pesticide.' 33 Two Israeli companies were
impleaded and subsequently moved for dismissal under the immunity
provisions of the FSIA by claiming to be instrumentalities of Israel.134
The two Israeli companies were denied instrumentality status because
they were separated from the State of Israel by one or more corporate
tiers. 135 The Court relied heavily on the unambiguous text of the FSIA to
125. See supra notes 68-70, 72 and accompanying text.
126. R. Doak Bishop, Sashe D. Dimitroff & Craig S. Miles, Strategic Options Available
When CatastropheStrikes the Major InternationalEnergy Project, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 635,
677 (2001).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (2006).
128. Id.
129. Riblett, supra note 110, at 10.
130. See, e.g., Petrobras By-Laws, supra note 67.
131. Patrick Heller, Commentary: To Succeed, an Iraqi NationalOil Company Needs an
Iraqi Oil Law, REVENUE WATCH INST. (Sept. 4, 2009) http://www.revenuewatch.org/news/
090409b.php; see also EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org
(last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
132. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003).
133. Id. at 471.
134. Id. at 471-72.
135. Id. at 473.
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come to its conclusion.1 36 However, the Court ignored one aspect of the
ownership prong when it announced "[a] corporation is an instrumentality of a foreign state under the FSIA only if the foreign state itself owns a
majority of the corporation's shares."' 37 The statutory text also allows
for agency or instrumentality status if the entity is majority-owned by a
political subdivision of the state.13 8 So, it appears that the Court left
open a small window for defendants to argue that they are an agency or
instrumentality because they are directly majority-owned by a political
subdivision of a foreign state.139 In fact, at least one U.S. district court
has expressed this in a case under the FSIA.140 Even if a NOC or its
subsidiary cannot satisfy the ownership prong, it may still qualify for immunity under the organ prong. 141
2.

NOCs Should Satisfy the Organ of the State Prong

NOCs should also satisfy the organ prong of the agency or instrumentality test in most cases, as should many of their subsidiaries.14 2 The tests
for whether an entity qualifies for immunity as an organ of the state are
found in federal common law because the FSIA does not define the
term.143 There is no definitive test for determining agency or instrumentality status under the organ prong; rather, a balancing of factors is appropriate.144 Two balancing tests-one with five factors and the other with
seven-have gained widespread use.14 5 The five-factor balancing test
used in the Second and Fifth Circuits consists of:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity; (3)
whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and
pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to
some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is treated
under foreign state law.146
136. Id. at 473, 476 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (2006) (stating "[tihe text of the
FSIA gives no indication that Congress intended . . . to depart from the general rules
regarding corporate formalities")).
137. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2).
139. See Vivas v. Boeing Co., No. 06-C-3566, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61625, at *23 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 21, 2007).
140. Id. (finding that instrumentality status of an entity majority-owned by a political
subdivision was unaffected by Dole).
141. Riblett, supra note 110, at 11.
142. See id.
143. Organ of the state is not defined in the definitions section of the FSIA. See 28
U.S.C. § 1603; USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 206 (3d Cir. 2003); Michael A.
Granne, Defining "Organ of a Foreign State" Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 3 (2008).
144. Granne, supra note 143, at 20.
145. Id. at 22.
146. Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004); Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 846-47 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11,
2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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The Third Circuit created the seven-factor test by dividing the first factor into two separate inquiries and adding ownership structure as another
factor to consider.147 The seven factors are:
(1) the circumstances surrounding the entity's creation; (2) the purpose of its activities; (3) the degree of supervision by the government; (4) the level of government financial support; (5) the entity's
employment policies, particularly regarding whether the foreign
state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries;
and (6) the entity's obligations and privileges under the foreign
state's laws .

. .

. [And] (7) the ownership structure of the entity.148

Regardless of which balancing test a court chooses to apply, it is highly
probable that any NOC sued in a U.S. court would qualify as an organ of
the state because of the creation, structure, ownership, and activities of
most NOCs. 1 4 9 The courts that have considered whether NOCs are agencies or instrumentalities under the FSIA have either assumed that they
were or have found them to be so under the balancing test.150 Once a
NOC establishes that it is an agency or instrumentality under one of the
two prongs, the plaintiff has the burden to show that an exception to sovereign immunity applies.15
B.

THE COMMERCIAL ACTIvrrY EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY

Once a defendant NOC establishes that it is entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to identify an
exception to immunity granted in §§ 1605-1607 of the statute.152 There
are several exceptions listed in the statute1 5 3 with commercial activity the
most commonly used. 154 The commercial activity exception to sovereign
immunity applies where:
147. USX Corp., 345 F.3d at 209; Granne, supra note 143, at 22-23.
148. USX Corp., 345 F.3d at 209. This test has also been used by a district court in the
Tenth Circuit. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Petroleos de Venez. Societa Anonima, 338 F. Supp. 2d
1208, 1215 (D. Colo. 2004).
149. See supra Part II.C.
150. See, e.g., Kelly, 213 F.3d at 846-49 (finding a subsidiary of Syria's NOC was an
organ of the state); Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos, S.A. de C.V. v. M/T
Respect, 89 F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding one of Pemex's subsidiaries was an organ
of the state); Stena Rederi AB v. Comision de Contratos del Comite Ejecutivo General del
Sindicato Revolucionario de Trabajadores Petroleros de la Republica Mexicana, S.C., 923
F.2d 380, 386 n.7 (5th Cir. 1991) (deciding without analyzing that Pemex was an agency or
instrumentality of Mexico); RSM Prod. Corp., 338 F. Supp. 2d at 1212 (finding that a
wholly owned subsidiary of PDVSA is an organ of the state after plaintiff stipulated that
PDVSA was an agency or instrumentality of the state).
151. Kelly, 213 F.3d at 847.
152. Id.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006). These include "waiver, commercial activity, expropriation . . ., the determination of rights in property present in the United States, and certain
torts occurring within U.S. territory." Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a "Person"?
Does it Matter?: PersonalJurisdiction,Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 115, 121 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
154. Riblett, supra note 110, at 32.
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the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. 5 5
The FSIA defines commercial activity as "either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."' 5 6
Courts must reference the nature, not the purpose, of the activity when
deciding whether it is commercial.' 57 Even if the activity is engaged in
for a sovereign purpose, such as buying military supplies, the commercial
nature of the transaction is controlling.' 5 8 So, where a foreign sovereign
acts as a private player in the market rather than as a regulator, it will not
be granted immunity. 159 This argument may be helpful to IOCs and service companies when trying to sue NOCs. This is because although the
NOC's enabling statute may state that the purpose of the NOC is to develop the nation's hydrocarbons "for the public welfare and social interest," if the activity involved is simply a service contract to drill a well at a
particular site, then that activity is probably more like the actions in
which a private landowner could engage.' 6 0
Even if the plaintiff can establish that the complained-of activity is
commercial in nature, the commercial activity exception contains a jurisdictional nexus that requires the conduct to either have occurred in the
United States or have a direct effect within the United States.161 This
jurisdictional nexus appears to be very similar to minimum contacts analyses in U.S. state and federal courts.162 This means that a plaintiff will
have a burdensome task proving the facts needed to establish jurisdiction
over the NOC under this exception and that the NOC has a distinct advantage over plaintiffs because of the blanket immunity provided to it.163
Although this burden seems harsh, it is consistent with the FSIA's purpose of making it difficult to sue foreign governments in U.S. courts.16 4
So, the FSIA will almost always apply to a NOC that raises it as a
defense because NOCs are almost certainly going to qualify as foreign
states under the statute. This shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show
that one of the exceptions to immunity applies, and that burden is
heavy. 6 5 In fact, NOCs enjoy substantial protections from suit under the
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
157. § 1603(d).
158. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1992).
159. Id. at 614.
160. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Petroleos de Venez. Societa Anonima, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1208,
1215 (D. Colo. 2004).
161. Halverson, supra note 153, at 157; Riblett, supra note 110, at 33.
162. Halverson, supra note 153, at 122.
163. See Riblett, supra note 110, at 33.
164. USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2003).
165. Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 847 (5th Cir. 2000).
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FSIA, and that fact must temper the enforcement of forum selection
clauses found in their contracts with private companies.166
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
UNDER THE BREMEN STANDARD
A.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE ENFORCEMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES

Forum selection clauses are considered to be "nearly ubiquitous in
modem business relationships of all kinds."' 67 A recent empirical study
of ninety-six international business transactions found forum selection
clauses were present in over four times as many contracts as arbitration
clauses.168 Forum selection clauses probably obtain their popularity because of the many benefits businesses believe they provide. These benefits include the ability to select a desirable forum for dispute resolution ex
ante, which increases predictability throughout the parties' contractual relationship. 169 Additionally, these clauses can be seen as a way to reduce
the costs of dispute resolution because of their almost universal enforcement in U.S. courts.170 Beyond predictability, forum selection clauses allow parties to assuage fears of bias by selecting a neutral jurisdiction in
which to resolve any disputes.171 However, there are some issues surrounding the use of forum selection clauses by NOCs that raise the question of whether, and how, these clauses should be enforced. These issues
will be discussed in detail in Section V.
As previously mentioned, the near universal enforceability of forum
selection clauses in U.S. courts may be one factor in their popularity. 172
But at one point, U.S. courts disfavored these clauses.173 The most cited
reason for disfavoring forum selection clauses was that it was against public policy for private parties to be able to oust a court of its jurisdiction.174
However, the Supreme Court rejected this justification in Bremen, 75 and
ever since that decision, forum selection clauses have been almost univer166. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 484 (2003); Riblett, supra note 110, at
29-35.
167. William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and
Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 1, 1 (2006).
168. Ya-Wei Li, Note, Dispute Resolution Clauses in InternationalContracts:An Empirical Study, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 789, 799 (2006).
169. Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure,
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1992); Jason Webb Yackee, Choice of Law Considerationsin
the Validity and Enforcement of International Forum Selection Agreements: Whose Law
Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 43, 45 (2004).
170. Solimine, supra note 169, at 52 (noting that because of the uniform enforceability

of forum selection clauses, it is less likely that a complainant will file suit in a forum not
agreed upon).
171. Id.
172. Yackee, supra note 169, at 48.
173. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); see also Solimine, supra
note 169, at 53-54.
174. Solimine, supra note 169, at 54; Woodward, supra note 167, at 15.
175. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12 (describing the idea of ouster as a "vestigial legal fiction").
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sally upheld.176
B.

A

REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN BREMEN AND
SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS AFFECTING FORUM SELECTION
CLAUSE ENFORCEABILITY

The pivotal event concerning the enforcement of forum selection
clauses in the United States was the Supreme Court's decision in
Bremen.' 7 The case generated copious commentary1 78 and description
but none with an eye for the problems raised when a NOC attempts to
enforce a forum selection clause. Therefore, a description of the case
with a view towards the unique characteristics of NOCs is helpful.
Bremen was a suit in admiralty, which the complainant Zapata filed in
Florida.179 Zapata solicited bids from several companies for the towage
of its self-elevated drilling rig from the Gulf of Mexico to the Adriatic
Sea. 180 Unterweser, a German corporation, submitted the winning bid,
and the final contract included a provision that stated "[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice." 18 1 The final
contract was the result of negotiations between the two parties where
several terms were altered, but the forum selection clause remained untouched. 182 During towing, heavy storms damaged the drilling rig, and
Unterweser's deep-sea tug, Bremen, towed the rig to Tampa Bay under
Zapata's instructions.18 3 Then Zapata filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, disregarding its promise to
litigate in London.184
Unterweser's attempt to enforce the forum selection clause in the district court failed, and Unterweser eventually appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.1 85 The Fifth Circuit held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to enforce the forum selection clause because London was not a more convenient forum than
Tampa Bay, and litigation in London could bar recovery because of other
exculpatory clauses in the contract. 18 6 Unterweser fared much better in
the Supreme Court.18 7 There, Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion
of the Court with only Justice White concurring and Justice Douglas dis176. Yackee, supra note 169, at 48.

177. See MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1; see also Phoebe Kornfeld, The Enforceability of
Forum-Selection ClausesAfter Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 ALASKA
L. REV. 175, 177 (1989); Woodward, supra note 167, at 15.
178. Checking citing references on Westlaw reveals that Bremen has been cited in 1,182
journal articles (last visited July 26, 2010).
179. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 3-4.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 3-4.
185. Id. at 4-8.
186. Id. at 7-8.
187. Id. at 8.
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senting.s88 The Court held that the forum selection clause should control
unless there was "a strong showing that it should be set aside" and remanded the case to the district court to give Zapata a chance to "show
that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching." 1 8 9 In fact, the
Court's instruction was that forum selection clauses "are prima facie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." 190
Some of the reasoning behind the opinion is especially vital to considering how forum selection clauses should be treated when a NOC is involved. First, Chief Justice Burger appeared to strongly consider the state
of the market and the rise of international trade as factors weighing in
favor of holding that forum selection clauses should be prima facie
valid.191 He started by taking notice of the expansion of overseas commercial activities of U.S. companies, and he noted that a policy disfavoring forum selection clauses smacked of parochialism. 192 Parochial
attitudes toward solving problems only in American courts would hinder
"[t]he expansion of American business and industry" and "would be a
heavy hand indeed on the future development of international commercial dealings by Americans."1 93 Finally, Chief Justice Burger referred
194
again to "present-day commercial realities" to support his conclusions.
This strong and repeated recognition of the realities of international trade
should weigh heavily on any legal rules affecting NOCs because of their
critical role in worldwide and U.S. energy markets.
Another justification for holding forum selection clauses valid was that
they reduce potential uncertainty and inconvenience, giving effect to the
parties' choices and thus supporting freedom to contract and party autonomy.19 5 However, it seems that Chief Justice Burger made several assumptions about the underlying contract in Bremen in his reasoning
about these factors. First, although there was some evidence of this, the
Chief Justice assumed that the contract at issue in this case was "a freely
negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue
influence, or overweening bargaining power."1 96 Additionally, the Chief
Justice assumed that the forum selection clause was in fact bargained-for
197 These
and that its inclusion was reflected in the price of the contract.
assumptions and the fact that Bremen was a case in admiralty, gave rise to
many questions about the enforceability of forum selection clauses in
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2, 20.
15.
10.
8.
8-9.
9.
15.
11-13.
12-13.
14.
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other scenarios; some of which have been addressed by other courts, and
some of which remain unanswered.
The Supreme Court implicitly extended the doctrine of enforceability
beyond admiralty just two years later. 198 Since then, federal courts have
consistently enforced forum selection clauses.199 Although U.S. federal
courts seem to uniformly apply Bremen in federal question and diversity
cases, commentators question whether the Bremen doctrine should be applied in purely domestic situations. 200 Another interesting question is
whether, given the fact that the FSIA supplies the sole basis for subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over foreign states (and their NOCs), the
Bremen doctrine should apply in cases where the party seeking to enforce
the forum selection clause is a NOC.
C.

THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK OF ENFORCEMENT

When a party challenges a forum selection clause, the proper approach
is to consider the clause to be prima facie valid, with the burden on the
challenging party to prove that enforcement of the clause would be unreasonable under the circumstances. 20 1 That burden is heavy. 202 Unreasonableness can be shown if any of the following factors are met:
(1) the incorporation of the forum selection clause into the agreement was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) the party seeking
to escape enforcement "will for all practical purposes be deprived of
his day in court" because of the grave inconvenience or unfairness of
the selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law
will deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of the forum selection clause would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum state.203
These four factors are supposedly not an exclusive list, but they appear
to be the only valid grounds that courts consider when a forum selection
clause is challenged. 204
To successfully argue that fraud or overreaching invalidates the challenged forum selection clause, the challenger must show that the fraud or
overreaching was specifically used to procure the clause and not the overall contract. 205 "Overreaching is that which results from an inequality of
198. Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518-21 (1974)).
199. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
537-39 (1995); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590-95 (1991); Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 962-63; Maxen Capital, LLC v. Sutherland, No. H-08-3590, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29308, at *20-23 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2009).

200. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum,Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 291, 315-16 (1988).
201. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10; see also Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 963.
202. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 17.
203. Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 963 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595).
204. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 594 (dismissing the Ninth Circuit's
independent justification for holding a forum selection clause unenforceable).
205. See Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 963 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 519 n.14 (1974)).
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bargaining power or other circumstances in which there is an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties." 206 Where the two
parties are sophisticated businesses or individuals courts will be less likely
to find overreaching. 2 07 This skepticism as to overreaching can be traced
to Bremen. 208 However, when one of the two parties is a NOC, this factor may swing in favor of the party challenging enforcement because the
NOC has something the other party does not-state power. Courts
should take the element of state power into account when deciding
whether a NOC and private party came to a truly negotiated agreement.
U.S. courts are skeptical of parties arguing that being forced to litigate
in a foreign forum under the forum selection clause would deprive the
party of its day in court because of grave inconvenience or unfairness.
This skepticism was born in Bremen, where the Supreme Court held that
if the forum selection clause is part of a "freely negotiated private international commercial agreement," then any inconvenience arising from litigating a dispute in the chosen forum was clearly foreseeable and,
therefore, agreeable to the party challenging enforcement. 209 Challengers to forum selection clauses have tried arguing that a lack of comparable remedies in the contract forum would deprive the party of its day in
court. 2 1 0 In Interamerican Trade, the plaintiffs argued that litigation in
Brazil would deprive them of their day in court because of the lack of a
jury trial, slowness of litigation in Brazil, unavailability of trial by depositions, and the requirement of a $2.2 million security deposit. 2 1 1 The court
rejected these arguments because all of these issues were foreseeable at
the time of contracting, and although the Brazilian court might be inconvenient, it would not be unjust. 2 12 Similarly, the lack of remedies comparable to those under the U.S. securities laws was not enough to hold a
forum selection clause unenforceable. 2 13
The third factor for finding a forum selection clause unenforceable"the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law will deprive the plaintiff of
a remedy"-seems to be analyzed in conjunction with the second factor. 2 1 4 As noted in the previous cases, the deprivation of a remedy has
often been analyzed as a factor in whether the chosen forum is gravely
206. Maxen Capital, LLC v. Sutherland, No. H-08-3590, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29308,
at *22 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2009) (quoting Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 965 n.17).
207. See id.
208. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) (stating the evidence disputes the notion of overreaching, and that "for all we know" the novelty of the transaction
was a factor in Unterweser refusing to take financial responsibility for the risks involved).
209. Id. at 16-18.
210. Interamerican Trade Corp. v. Companhia Fabricadora de Pecas, 973 F.2d 487, 489
(6th Cir. 1992); Alt. Delivery Solutions, Inc. v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., No. SA-05-CA0172-XR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15949, at *45-47 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2005).
211. Interamerican Trade Corp., 973 F.2d at 489.
212. Id. at 489-90.
213. Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 967 (5th Cir. 1997).
214. Id. at 963.
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inconvenient or unfair.2 15 However, a very recent case out of the Northern District of West Virginia analyzed the third factor independently of
the second factor and came to the conclusion that to be successful, a challenge must show "more than a less favorable outcome in the foreign
court." 2 16 In Sheldon, the plaintiff signed an agreement specifying German courts of the European Court of Justice as the exclusive forum for
litigating any claims regarding the contract between the plaintiff and defendants. 2 17 The court found that although the plaintiff's remedies might
be less favorable in a German court, the German Civil Code did provide
an opportunity to seek damages under both breach of contract and tort
theories. 218 That actual damages were limited, punitive damages were
unavailable, contingent fee arrangements were only available in limited
circumstances, and a jury trial was unavailable was not enough to meet
the unreasonableness standard. 2 19
The final factor of the unreasonableness test has also been difficult for
challengers to satisfy. First, it appears that the public policy must be declared ex ante, although it is not clear whether the declaration must occur
prior to the time of contract or prior to the time of Suit. 2 2 0 Second, a
public policy argument may be effective where the policy declares that
the particular claim pursued must only be brought within the courts of
the forum in which suit is brought. 2 21 It seems that these two requirements combine to form a very high hurdle, especially when combined
with Bremen's caution against taking the "parochial [view] that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts." 222 In fact, not
even the strong public policy announced in U.S. securities laws was
enough to satisfy the public policy factor of the unreasonableness test. 2 2 3
V.

RESOLVING THE ISSUES OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE
ENFORCEABILITY WHERE ONE PARTY IS A NOC

So, forum selection clauses are favored in U.S. courts, and challengers
must overcome a very heavy burden to successfully defeat such a
215. See, e.g., Interamerican Trade Corp., 973 F.2d at 489-90; see also Maxen Capital,
LLC v. Sutherland, No. H-08-3590, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29308, at *20-22 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
3, 2009).
216. Sheldon v. Hart, No. 5:09-CV-51, 2010 WL 114007, at *7 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 8,
2010).
217. Id. at *1-2.
218. Id. at *7.
219. Id.; see also Gita Sports Ltd. v. SG Sensortechnik GmbH & Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d
432, 440 (W.D.N.C. 2008).
220. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (stating the clause is "unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which
suit is brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision" (emphasis added)).
221. Woods v. Christensen Shipyards, Ltd., No. 04-61432-CIV, 2005 WL 5654643, at *10
(S.D. Fla. Sep. 23, 2005) (stating "that there is a distinction between public policy" regarding venue and "substantive protections" and that the public policy Bremen speaks of refers
to public policy regarding venue).
222. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.
223. Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 965-67 (5th Cir. 1997).
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clause. 224 However, given some of the previously discussed aspects of
NOCs, the current reality of U.S. oil dependence, and the predicted future of the U.S. demand for oil, should the analysis change? The answer
is a resounding yes. The arguments for making a change in the doctrine
are based on NOCs' structure and function, their use of economic and
state power, and the realities of the international energy markets. 2 2 5
First, however, there is a preliminary question that must be resolved.
Should Bremen's doctrine of forum-selection-clause enforceability be extended to situations where one party is a NOC, or should a different test
apply?
A.

BREMEN SHOULD EXTEND TO SITUATIONS INVOLVING NOCs

The enforceability of forum selection clauses where one party is a NOC
should be governed under the Bremen standard. Recall that Bremen was
a case in admiralty and that it was later extended to other types of
cases. 226 The question remains whether the unreasonableness test should
apply to a case arising under the FSIA because, although the FSIA is a
federal statute, it is only jurisdictional. Whether a federal question is
raised is debatable. So far, commentators question the extension of the
unreasonableness test to areas outside federal admiralty cases, 2 2 7 but
courts almost uniformly accept it.2 2 8
The FSIA allows a NOC to waive the protections of the FSIA and consent to subject matter jurisdiction where that jurisdiction would otherwise
be lacking. 229 The inclusion of waiver as a possible exception to jurisdictional immunity indicates Congress' willingness to allow a foreign state to
consent to jurisdiction in U.S. courts. 2 3 0 In this situation, the foreign state
would be sued in a U.S. court, but any concerns for comity 2 3 1 and avoiding parochialism are moot because of the foreign state's consent. Moreover, the realities of the marketplace in which NOCs operate today show
that forum selection clauses remain popular and at least theoretically effective in reducing the costs and uncertainty in contracting. 232 The most
likely method by which a NOC will waive jurisdictional immunity is the
forum selection clause; therefore, forum selection clauses are able to operate consistently within the framework of the FSIA.
224. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 17.
225. See supra Part II.C (describing how NOCs get power by controlling reserves);
supra Part II.B (discussing the relationship between American and foreign oil producers).
226. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
227. Mullenix, supra note 200, at 306; Yackee, supra note 169, at 64-66.
228. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528,
537-38 (1995); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590-95 (1991); Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 962-63; see also Maxen Capital, LLC v. Sutherland, No. H-08-3590,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29308, at *20-22 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2009); Yackee, supra note 169,
at 48.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006).
230. See id.

231. See Granne, supra note 143, at 6.
232. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972); supra notes 167-71
and accompanying text.
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However, the fact that the FSIA is the sole basis for jurisdiction over a
foreign state may caution against allowing parties to choose which court
will hear their complaints. 2 33 This is because public policy announced in
the FSIA allows foreign states the entitlement to a presumption of immunity from suit in U.S. courts. 2 34 This public policy should be considered
when deciding whether NOCs can contract out of U.S. jurisdiction. However, because NOCs are almost certainly foreign states under the FSIA,
which grants significant protections from suit in the United States, it
would be illogical for a NOC to waive its protections. If the Bremen doctrine were not applied in suits under the FSIA, it would be easy to imagine a situation where a NOC, which chose not to include a forum
selection clause in its contract, could choose to waive its sovereign immunity to gain access to U.S. courts for offense. But on the flip side of the
coin, the U.S. company would be at a disadvantage because it could not
force the NOC into U.S. courts because of FSIA immunity, even when
the company may have no potential remedies in other jurisdictions. 235
This situation supports the argument that forum selection clauses should
be enforceable under the Bremen standard to provide some protection to
the private companies that deal with NOCs. How that enforcement takes
shape is discussed next.
B.

SEVERAL FACTORS SUPPORT ALTERING THE BREMEN STANDARD
FOR ENFORCING FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES WHERE ONE
PARTY IS A NOC

The Bremen standard should apply to suits involving NOCs, but the

test should be altered because of NOCs' status as foreign states under the
FSIA and their combined economic and state power. Applying the
Bremen standard for enforcement of forum selection clauses without any

changes ignores the fact that NOCs are qualitatively different from private enterprises. First, although NOCs are often organized as corporate
entities separate from their state's government, they often take action
more readily identified with sovereign power. 236 Additionally, NOCs
control the vast majority of the world's proven oil and gas reserves, and
this will give NOCs increasing economic and strategic power as time goes
on. 2 3 7 Finally, in addition to acting like sovereigns in some of their dealings, current U.S. law treats NOCs as sovereigns under the FSIA. 2 3 8
233. Halverson, supra note 153, at 119; Granne, supra note 143, at 3.
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006).
235. In fact, it seems that at least once in recent history a subsidiary of a NOC attempted to challenge a forum selection clause naming its home country as the exclusive
forum, seeking the benefit of suing in the U.S. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA),
Inc., 240 F. App'x 612, 613-15 (5th Cir. 2007). This attempt was foiled by the enforcement
of the forum selection clause. Id. at 618.
236. See supra Part II.C (outlining NOCs' roles in acts of resource nationalism).
237. See supra Part II.C (describing NOCs' economic power in terms of their control of
world reserves); supra Part II.B (describing America's predicted continuing dependence on
foreign oil over the next twenty-five years).
238. See supra Part III.
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These qualities of NOCs affect the Bremen doctrine in two ways: (1) the
transactions at issue definitely lack the flavor of a "private international
agreement" 239 and (2) NOCs and private companies have a clear difference in their respective power.
Chief Justice Burger repeatedly emphasized that the forum selection
clause at issue in Bremen was part of a "private international agreement." 240 When a NOC is involved, the transaction begins to lose some
of its private character. For example, when a NOC and an IOC agree to a
contract for the development of an oil field, but the NOC later decides to
nationalize the project, the private character of the transaction is destroyed.24 1 No private company could simply appropriate equipment,
supplies, and interests in real property like NOCs have routinely done
around the world. 2 4 2 Additionally, the private nature of contracting with
a NOC for development of an oil field, or for a drilling services contract,
is questionable because of NOCs' status in U.S. courts. The majority of
the world's NOCs are most likely going to be considered foreign states
under the FSIA and will, therefore, have very strong protections against
suit in the United States. 243 Changing the Bremen doctrine to allow for
additional scrutiny of a forum selection clause will not reduce NOCs'
power and legal right to accomplish their national goals, but it would result in a more fair bargaining process for private companies dealing with
NOCs.
The second reason for changing the application of the Bremen doctrine
when a NOC is involved in the dispute is that there is a key difference in
bargaining power between the NOC and a private company. This difference in power is due in part to the special status of NOCs under their own
countries' laws and the FSIA. 24 4 In their home states, many NOCs enjoy
"special status in the hydrocarbon domain" 245 as the sole entity allowed
to develop the country's hydrocarbon resources. 24 6 Another source of
the difference in bargaining power between NOCs and private companies
stems from NOCs' control over one of the most precious commodities on
earth-oil. Although efforts to develop green technology and alternative
energy sources are increasing, the world and America's dependence on
oil is not going away any time soon. 2 4 7 This difference in bargaining
power, especially NOC state power, necessitates the following changes to
the Bremen doctrine.
239. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1972).
240. Id. at 12-14.
241. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (Exxon Mobil in Venezuela).
242. See id.; see also supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (Petrosucre operates
ENSCO 69).
243. See supra Part 1II; Riblett, supra note 110, at 3.
244. See Riblett, supra note 110, at 3.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., About PDVSA, supra note 72.
247. See supra Part II.B.
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PLACING A BURDEN OF PRODUCTION ON NOCs WOULD PROTECT
PRIVATE COMPANIES WHILE STAYING TRUE TO THE
REASONING OF BREMEN

The simplest and least costly way to increase the protections for private
companies dealing with NOCs is to change the Bremen doctrine by requiring NOCs to produce some evidence that the forum selection clause
at issue was freely negotiated. 24 8 Adding a burden of production to the
party seeking enforcement of the forum selection clause addresses the
potential problems that accompany dealing with a NOC without disregarding Chief Justice Burger's reasoning in Bremen.249 Once the NOC
satisfies the burden of production, the process of enforcement continues
at the original starting point of the Bremen doctrine: the forum selection
clause is considered prima facie valid, and the burden is on the challenging party to show that enforcement would be unreasonable under the circumstances. 2 50 Chief Justice Burger reasoned that placing the burden of
persuasion on the party challenging enforcement of the clause supported
the concepts of party autonomy and freedom of contract and accounted
for realities of international trade. 251 Additionally, this structure for analyzing the enforceability of forum selection clauses avoided the pitfall of
parochialism. 252 Thus, the proposed burden of production (1) supports
the concepts of party autonomy and freedom of contract, accounting for
the widespread use of forum selection clauses and (2) avoids claims of
parochialism. 253
First, the burden of production is not onerous and will not negatively
impact the use of forum selection clauses in international contracts. This
is because all that should be required to satisfy the burden of production
is some evidence of bargaining for the forum selection clause. 254 For
example, in Bremen, the German company submitted an affidavit stating
"that it specified English courts 'in an effort to meet Zapata Off-Shore
Company half way."' 255 This affidavit is the kind of evidence that should
be required to satisfy the proposed burden of production. However,
under this burden of production, more detail should be required to show
that the forum selection clause was freely negotiated. With supporting
documentation, such as the preliminary drafts of the contracts, Unterweser's affidavit would have been enough to satisfy the burden of production, and Bremen would have the same outcome. Additionally, the
burden may be satisfied by submitting transcripts of negotiations, deposi248. This burden of production should be placed on the party seeking to enforce the
forum selection clause. However, since it will most often be the NOC, the discussion assumes a NOC will be the party seeking to enforce the clause.
249. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972).
250. See id. at 10.
251. See Mullenix, supra note 200, at 307-13; see also supra Part IV.B.
252. See supra Part IV.B.
253. See id. See generally Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13 (discussing the benefits of party
autonomy and freedom to contract regarding forum selection).
254. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14.
255. Id. at 14 n.14 (citing the circuit court's dissent and quoting from the affidavit).
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tion testimony, live testimony, or documentary evidence, such as a sequence of contracts demonstrating a give and take involving the forum
selection clause.2 56
Because the burden is not onerous, this small change should not discourage parties from including forum selection clauses as a method of
improving certainty in their contractual relationship. 2 57 This comports
with Chief Justice Burger's frequent references to the realities of international trade.258 This change should not negatively affect the popularity of
forum selection clauses in international commercial contracts. 2 59 In fact,
forum selection clauses that have the support of negotiation documentation between the parties should be even more unassailable in court and
should cut down on litigation challenging those clauses, thus reducing potential costs of litigation.
Second, placing the burden of production on the NOC provides private
companies protection from abuses of state power while avoiding the specter of parochialism. This increased protection for private companies
arises from the predicted effects of the proposed burden of production.
First, NOCs would most likely create a record of their negotiations over
the forum selection clauses to protect themselves. The important secondary effect of this behavior is that the private companies will be made
fully aware of the import of the forum selection clause and will have engaged in some level of discussion about the clause during negotiations.
Another tertiary effect of this behavior is that NOCs will have better protection should a private company later challenge the forum selection
clause. This behavior models what the Chief Justice assumed was present
in Bremen.2 60 This behavior also goes toward assuring that the forum
selection clause is really a freely-negotiated term even when the NOC
insists that the forum selection clause is non-negotiable. 261 The taint of
parochialism is easily avoided not only because the burden on the NOC is
so small but also because the doctrine should give effect to the parties'
choice of forum in most cases. Therefore, the concepts of party autonomy and freedom of contract remain supported by the Bremen doctrine. 262 Finally, if NOCs around the world find the proposed changes
objectionable and decide to avoid forum selection clauses, NOCs would
most likely increase their use of international commercial arbitration. If
so, private companies would still have improved protection when dealing
with NOCs, and there would be a few less cases crowding the U.S. courts.
The secondary, but very important, effect of increased use of interna256. See id. at 14 n.15.
257. See id. at 13-14, 14 n.15.
258. Id. at 8-9, 15; see supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
259. See Li, supra note 168, at 799.
260. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 14 (stating "it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did
not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences
of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations").
261. This is similar to the assumption in Bremen that the contract price took the tower's
reluctance to accept financial responsibility for the risks of the towing job. Id. at 16.
262. See id. at 11.
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tional arbitration would be more widespread enforceability of
judgments. 263
In the absence of making any changes to the Bremen standard for enforcing forum selection clauses, courts considering these clauses when a
NOC is involved should closely examine many of the same factors discussed in this comment under the existing framework. The most important factors to consider are the inherent differences in bargaining power
between the private company and NOC that can lead to overreaching and
the lack of a private international agreement because of the NOC's status
as a "foreign state" under the FSIA. 2 64 Finally, Congress needs to give a
clear statement of U.S. energy policy for the future. Given the predicted
energy consumption for the near future, this is an area where a clearly
articulated public policy is necessary to engender consistency and predictability in business dealings with NOCs.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Forum selection clauses are a part of everyday business-life in international commerce, and they owe their popularity to many factors. These
clauses help to create predictability in contractual relationships and reduce dispute-resolution costs. They are expressions of the venerated concepts of freedom of contract and party autonomy. However, the current
treatment of these clauses in a battle between private companies and
NOCs often leave the private players at a significant disadvantage. Without some change to the existing doctrine, private oil companies, drilling
companies, transport companies, and others in the petroleum industry
often lack negotiating power up front and legal power on the back end in
their dealings with the world's NOCs. In this environment, there is no
clear legal check against NOC power within U.S. courts, and victims of
nationalization and resource nationalism are often left without domestic
legal recourse.
By placing an initial burden of production on a NOC attempting to
enforce a forum selection clause, these problems disappear without creating new ones. This small change should not discourage the use of forum
selection clauses but should instead encourage real discussion of dispute
resolution procedures and enhance the "private" nature of the negotiations. This in turn will help to remove the potential use of state power
from the relationship between NOCs and private companies. Finally, this
change does not raise the problems associated with parochialism because
most forum selection clauses made under this doctrine will continue to
enjoy enforcement.
There is no reason to disregard this proposed change, and there is no
need to rely on the Supreme Court to take the first step. The fact that
NOCs are already considered to be foreign states under current U.S. law
263. See Li, supra note 168, at 795-96.
264. See supra Part II.C; Riblett, supra note 110, at 3.
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supports the argument that their commercial dealings are not perfectly
private in nature. However, there is no need to abandon the current
framework for enforcement entirely. Instead, the current framework can
be slightly changed without having to overrule it. This change not only
will help provide private U.S. companies with bargaining power at the
negotiating table ex ante but also will help protect them from the worst
abuses of resource nationalism by NOCs.
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